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WORDS THAT WOUND: A TORT ACTION




Five years ago in Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach, Inc.' the
Washington Supreme Court held that a Mexican-American's
allegations that fellow employees had subjected him to a cam-
paign of racial abuse stated a claim against his employer for the
tort of outrage. 2 The plaintiff alleged that he had suffered
"humiliation and embarrassment by reason of racial jokes, slurs
and comments"3 and that the defendant's agents and employees
had wrongfully accused him of stealing the employer's property,
thereby preventing him from gaining employment and holding
him up to public ridicule. Focusing upon the alleged racial abuse,
the court declared that "racial epithets which were once part of
common usage may not now be looked upon as 'mere insulting
language.""
Eleven months later, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in Collin v. Smith5 affirmed a federal
t The author is deeply indebted to the following individuals for their help
and encouragement during the preparation of this article: Lisa Frye; Peter
McAllen; Karen Perret; Gary Schwartz, Professor of Law, UCLA; and Steve Shif-
frin, Professor of Law, UCLA.
*J.D. University of California, Berkeley, 1974. Professor of Law, UCLA
Law School.
88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977)(en banc).
2 The tort is also known as "intentional infliction of emotional distress." See
id. at737 n.1, 565 P.2d at 1174 n.1 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1)
(1965) : "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or reckless-
ly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emo-
tional distress. ").
1 88 Wash. 2d at 736, 565 P.2d at 1174.
4 Id. at 741, 565 P.2d at 1177.
1 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
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district court's decision declaring unconstitutional certain or-
dinances of the Village of Skokie, Illinois, which had been
drafted to block a demonstration by members of the National
Socialist Party of America. 6 The village argued that the
demonstration, together with the intended display of Nazi
uniforms and swastikas, would inflict psychological trauma on its
many Jewish citizens, some of whom had lived through the
Holocaust. The court of appeals acknowledged that "many peo-
ple would find [the] demonstration extremely mentally and emo-
tionally disturbing. '7 Mentioning Contreras, the court also
noted that Illinois recognizes the "new tort" of intentional inflic-
tion of severe emotional distress, which might well include the ut-
tering of racial slurs.8 Nevertheless, the threat of criminal
penalities imposed by the ordinance was held impermissibly to
abridge the plaintiffs' first amendment rights. 9
The concatenation of these two cases and the unsettled con-
dition in which Collin leaves tort actions for racial speech suggest
that reappraisal of these tort actions is in order. This Article will
argue that an independent tort action for racial insults is both
permissible and necessary. The Article will first examine the
harms caused by racism and racial insults to the victims, to the
perpetrators, and to society as a whole. It will then examine the
various doctrines under which plaintiffs have brought lawsuits
for racial insult, concluding that these doctrines fail to provide
adequate protection against such language. The Article will next
consider objections to an independent tort that are based on the
difficulty of apportioning damages and on first amendment con-
' Id. at 1210. One of the ordinances prohibited the "dissemination of any
materials.., which promotes and incites [sic] hatred against persons by reason of
their race" and made violations punishable by fine or imprisonment.
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1206 & n.17 (court "intimate[s] no views" on whether specific in-
dividuals could recover damages caused by such a demonstration and whether first
amendment would bar such an action). The lower court in Collin also refused
to reach the question of the constitutional validity of a tort for racial insults. See
Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 695 n.12 (N.D. Ill. 1978)("The federal courts
should be hesitant to sweepingly invalidate state laws where narrower rulings will
adequately protect constitutional rights.").
9 578 F.2d at 1202-07.
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cerns. The Article will conclude with a brief sketch of the con-
tours of the proposed cause of action.
I. Psychological, Sociological, and Political
Effects of Racial Insults
American society remains deeply afflicted by racism. Long
before slavery became the mainstay of the plantation society of
the antebellum South, Anglo-Saxon attitudes of racial superiority
left their stamp on the developing culture of colonial America. 10
Today, over a century after the abolition of slavery, many
citizens suffer from discriminatory attitudes and practices, infec-
ting our economic system, our cultural and political institutions,
and the daily interactions of individuals." The idea that color is
a badge of inferiority and a justification for the denial of oppor-
tunity and equal treatment is deeply ingrained.
The racial insult remains one of the most pervasive channels
through which discriminatory attitudes are imparted.I2 Such
language injures the dignity and self-regard of the person to
10 See generally A. Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color (1978).
11 See G. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 77-78 (1954)(studies led resear-
chers to estimate that four-fifths of American population harbored enough an-
tagonism toward minority groups to influence their daily conduct); id. at 197-98
(8401q agreement among college students for stereotype of blacks as superstitious).
See generally Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
(Kerner Commission) 203-82 (N.Y. Times ed. 1968).
12 Despite recent civil rights activism, verbal racism has not disappeared.
See, e.g., Racism Flares on Campus, Time, Dec. 8, 1980, at 28 ("stinking black
monkeys" and other messages sent to black students at Williams College; black
student leader at Harvard University found her office calendar defaced with racist
slogans; crosses burned at Purdue University; letter addressed to black student
dormitory at Wesleyan University spoke of "wip[ing] all g.d. niggers off the face
of the earth"). A black dean at Harvard University attributed the recent upsurge
in racist slurs and acts to a change in national mood, which has made such acts
"once again.., respectable." Id. See also McQueen, The Anguish and Humilia-
tion of Interracial Couples, Sacramento Bee, Feb. 5, 1981, § C, at 4, col. 1;
Trescott, Is Social Racism Now Becoming 'Acceptable?," L.A. Times, June 12,
1981, § V, at 2, col. 1 ("the veiled insult, contempt masquerading as a joke, [and]
the direct slur," underground in 1960's and early 1970's, now being "recycled... as
a protest against minority gains").
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whom it is addressed, communicating the message that distinc-
tions of race are distinctions of merit, dignity, status, and
personhood.'3 Not only does the listener learn and internalize
the messages contained in racial insults, 4 these messages color
our society's institutions and are transmitted to succeeding
generations. 5
A. The Harms of Racism
The psychological harms caused by racial stigmatization are
often much more severe than those created by other stereotyping
actions. Unlike many characteristics upon which stigmatization
may be based, membership in a racial minority can be considered
neither self-induced, like alcoholism or prostitution, nor
alterable. Race-based stigmatization is, therefore, "one of the
most fruitful causes of human misery. Poverty can be
eliminated-but skin color cannot."'6 The plight of members of
racial minorities may be compared with that of persons with
physical disfigurements; the point has been made that
[a] rebuff due to one's color puts [the victim] in very
much the situation of the very ugly person or one suffer-
ing from a loathsome disease. The suffering. . may be
aggravated by a consciousness of incurability and even
blameworthiness, a self-reproaching which tends to leave
the individual still more aware of his loneliness and
unwantedness. 7
The psychological impact of this type of verbal abuse has
been described in various ways. Kenneth Clark has observed,
"Human beings ... whose daily experience tells them that almost
nowhere in society are they respected and granted the ordinary
dignity and courtesy accorded to others will, as a matter of
" See infra text accompanying notes 57-70.
'4 See infra text accompanying notes 18-22 & 72-76.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 44-53.
6 p. Mason, Race Relations 2 (1970).
'70. Cox, Caste, Class and Race 383 (1948).
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course, begin to doubt their own worth." 8 Minorities may come
to believe the frequent accusations that they are lazy, ignorant,
dirty, and superstitious.19 "The accumulation of negative im-
ages ... present[s] them with one massive and destructive choice:
either to hate one's self, as culture so systematically demand[s], or
to have no self at all, to be nothing."2
The psychological responses to such stigmatization consist of
feelings of humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred. Consequently,
it is neither unusual nor abnormal for stigmatized individuals to
feel ambivalent about their self-worth and identity.2 This am-
bivalence arises from the stigmatized individual's awareness that
others perceive him or her as falling short of societal standards,
standards which the individual has adopted. Stigmatized in-
dividuals thus often are hypersensitive and anticipate pain at the
prospect of contact with "normals."I
It is no surprise, then, that racial stigmatization injures its
victims' relationships with others. Racial tags deny minority in-
dividuals the possibility of neutral behavior in cross-racial
contacts,2 thereby impairing the victims' capacity to form close
interracial relationships. Moreover, the psychological responses
of self-hatred and self-doubt unquestionably affect even the vic-
tims' relationships with members of their own group.
24
The psychological effects of racism may also result in mental
illness and psychosomatic disease.Y The affected person may
11 K. Clark, Dark Ghetto 63-64 (1965).
19 See G. Allport, supra note 11, at 152.
20 J. Kovel, White Racism: A Psychohistory 195 (1970).
21 See E. Goffman, Stigma 7 (1963). See also J. Griffin, Black Like Me
(1960)(white journalist dyed skin, assumed black identity, traveled through South,
was treated as a black; began to assume physical demeanor and psychological set
of black itinerant).
I2 See E. Goffman, supra note 21, at 17, 131.
2 See S. Hayakawa, Symbol, Status, and Personality 76-78 (1966).
24 See, e.g., G. Allport, supra note 11, at 9, 148-49; M. Goodman, Race
Awareness in Young Children 46-47, 55-58, 60 (rev. ed. 1964). See also Cota
Robles de Suarez, Skin Color as a Factor of Racial Identification and Preference
of Young Chicano Children, Chi. J. Soc. Sci. & Arts, Spring 1971, at 107; Steven-
son & Stewart, A Developmental Study of Racial Awareness in Young Children,
29 Child Dev. 399 (1958).
23 See, e.g., Harburg, Erfurt, Havenstein, Chape, Schull & Schork, Socio-
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react by seeking escape through alcohol, drugs, or other kinds of
anti-social behavior. The rates of narcotic use and admission to
public psychiatric hospitals are much higher in minority com-
munities than in society as a whole.26
The achievement of high socioeconomic status does not
diminish the psychological harms caused by prejudice. The effort
to achieve success in business and managerial careers exacts a
psychological toll even among exceptionally ambitious and up-
wardly mobile members of minority groups. Furthermore, those
who succeed "do not enjoy the full benefits of their professional
status within their organizations, because of inconsistent treat-
ment by others resulting in continual psychological stress, strain,
and frustration."27 As a result, the incidence of severe
psychological impairment caused by the environmental stress of
prejudice and discrimination is not lower among minority group
members of high socioeconomic status. 8
One of the most troubling effects of racial stigmatization is
that it may affect parenting practices among minority group
members, thereby perpetuating a tradition of failure. A recent
study29 of minority mothers found that many denied the real
significance of color in their lives, yet were morbidly sensitive to
matters of race. Some, as a defense against aggression, identified
excessively with whites, accepting whiteness as superior. Most
had negative expectations concerning life's chances. Such self-
conscious, hypersensitive parents, preoccupied with the ambigui-
Ecological Stress, Suppressed Hostility, Skin Color, and Black- White Male Blood
Pressure: Detroit, 35 Psychosomatic Med. 276 (1973)[hereinafter cited as Har-
burg](suppressed hostility and darker skin "interact for high stress males and relate
to high blood pressure"); Kiev, Psychiatric Disorders in Minority Groups, in
Psychology and Race 416, 420-24 (P. Watson ed. 1973).
26 See K. Clark, supra note 18, at 82-84, 90. See generally W. Grier & P.
Cobbs, Black Rage 161 (1968)(paranoid symptoms are significantly more frequent
among mentally ill blacks than among mentally ill whites); Special Populations
Sub-Task Panel on Mental Health of Hispanic Americans, Report to the Presi-
dent's Commission on Mental Health 2, 10-11, 40 (1978).
J7 .Martin & C. Franklin, Minority Group Relations 3 (1979).
28 See Joint Commission on Mental Health of Children, Social Change and
the Mental Health of Children 99-100 (1973).
29 Kiev, supra note 25, at 416, 420-21.
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ty of their own social position, are unlikely to raise confident,
achievement-oriented, and emotionally stable children.
In addition to these long-term psychological harms of racial
labeling, the stresses of racial abuse may have physical conse-
quences. There is evidence that high blood pressure is associated
with inhibited, constrained, or restricted anger, and not with
genetic factors, 30 and that insults produce elevation in blood
pressure." American blacks have higher blood pressure levels
and higher morbidity and mortality rates from hypertension,
hypertensive disease, and stroke than do white counterparts.32
Further, there exists a strong correlation between degree of
darkness of skin for blacks and level of stress felt, a correlation
that may be caused by the greater discrimination experienced by
dark-skinned blacks. 33
In addition to such emotional and physical consequences,
racial stigmatization may damage a victim's pecuniary interests.
The psychological injuries severely handicap the victim's pursuit
of a career. The person who is timid, withdrawn, bitter,
hypertense, or psychotic will almost certainly fare poorly in
employment settings. An experiment in which blacks and whites
of similar aptitudes and capacities were put into a competitive
situation found that the blacks exhibited defeatism, half-hearted
competitiveness, and "high expectancies of failure."34 For many
minority group members, the equalization of such quantifiable
variables as salary and entry level would be an insufficient an-
tidote to defeatist attitudes because the psychological price of at-
tempting to compete is unaffordable; they are "programmed for
30 See Harburg, supra note 25, at 292.
3' See Gentry, Effects of Frustration, Attack, and Prior Aggressive Train-
ing on Overt Aggression and Vascular Processes, 16 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychology 718 (1970).
32 See Harburg, supra note 25, at 294. See generally L.A. Times, Jan. 14,
1981, § I-A, at 4, col. 1 (discussing report of Children's Defense Fund)(black
children more likely to be sick and to be without regular source of health care
than white children; black children are three times as likely as white children to
be labeled mentally retarded, and twice as likely to drop out of school before the
twelfth grade).
11 See Harburg, supra note 25, at 285-90.
3 J. Martin & C. Franklin, supra note 27, at 43. See G. Allport, supra note
11, at 159.
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failure."3 Additionally, career options for the victims of racism
are closed off by institutional racism 36 -the subtle and un-
conscious racism in schools, hiring decisions, and the other prac-
tices which determine the distribution of social benefits and
responsibilities.
Unlike most of the actions for which tort law provides
redress to the victim, racial labeling and racial insults directly
harm the perpetrator. Bigotry harms the individuals who harbor
it by reinforcing rigid thinking, thereby dulling their moral and
social senses37 and possibly leading to a "mildly ... paranoid"
mentality. 38 There is little evidence that racial slurs serve as a
"safety valve" for anxiety which would otherwise be expressed in
violence. 39
Racism and racial stigmatization harm not only the victim
and the perpetrator of individual racist acts but also society as a
whole. Racism is a breach of the ideal of egalitarianism, that "all
men are created equal" and each person is an equal moral agent,
an ideal that is a cornerstone of the American moral and legal
system. 40 A society in which some members regularly are sub-
3 J. Martin & C. Franklin, supra note 27, at 4.
36 See generally Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, supra note 11, ch. 7 ("Unemployment, Family Structure, and Social
Disorganization"); Casas, Wampold & Atkinson, The Categorization of Ethnic
Stereotypes by University Counselors, 3 Hispanic J. Behavioral Sci. 75, 81
(1981)("[R]esults suggest that counselors have a constellation of stereotypes for
each ethnic group; the confirmation of one stereotype in this constellation prob-
ably will tend to confirm the entire constellation.").
3' See G. Allport, supra note 11, at 170-86, 371-84, 407-08.
38 Allport, The Bigot in Our Midst, 40 Commonweal 582 (1944), reprinted
in Anatomy of Racial Prejudice 161, 164 (G. deHuszar ed. 1946).
11 See G. Allport, supra note 11, at 62, 252, 460-61, 467-72 (rejecting view
of racist conduct as catharsis and arguing that racist attitudes themselves can be
curtailed by law). But see R. Williams, The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions
41 (1947); Berkovitz, The Case for Bottling Up Rage, Psychology Today, July
1973, at 24; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1053 (1936)("[I]t would be unfortunate if the law closed
all safety valves through which irascible tempers might legally blow off steam.").
40 E.g., U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1 (slavery prohibited); id. amend. XIV,
§ 1 ("No state shall... deny to any person... the equal protection of the laws.");
id. amend. XV, § 1 (right to vote not to be abridged by reason of race or color).
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jected to degradation because of their race hardly exemplifies this
ideal. The failure of the legal system to redress the harms of
racism, and of racial insults, conveys to all the lesson that
egalitarianism is not a fundamental principle; the law, through
inaction, implicitly teaches that respect for individuals is of little
importance. Moreover, unredressed breaches of the egalitarian
ideal may demoralize all those who prefer to live in a truly equal
society, making them unwilling participants in the perpetuation
of racism and racial inequality.
To the extent that racism contributes to a class system,4'
society has a paramount interest in controlling or suppressing it.
Racism injures the career prospects, social mobility, and inter-
See generally Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term -Foreword: In Defense of
the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1976); Dworkin, Social
Science and Constitutional Rights: The Consequences of Uncertainty, 6 J. L. &
Educ. 3 (1977).
41 It is difficult for the majority culture to accept responsibilty for the
submergence of the minority culture, in part because the existence of a minority
culture contradicts the larger society's formal values. See, e.g., G. Myrdal, An
American Dilemma xliii (1944). The "American dilemma" is described by Myr-
dal as
the conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations preserved on the
general plane which we shall call the 'American Creed,' where the
American thinks, talks and acts under the influence of high national and
Christian precepts, and, on the other hand, the valuations on specific
planes of individual and group living, where personal and local interests;
economic, social and sexual jealousies; considerations of community
prestige and conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or
types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses and habits
dominate his outlook.
Id.
Myrdal and other writers believe that the dilemma of minority group members
cannot be altered significantly without changes in the way society views and treats
minorities. See K. Clark, Prejudice and Your Child 8, 51 (1963); G. Myrdal, supra,
at xliii. Clark, for example, writes that "self-hatred... cannot be understood in
terms only of the minority group member's reaction to other members of his group.
It is in fact a reflection of the Negro's reaction to all of the negative pressures
that bombard him.... If there are to be significant changes ... these changes can
come only from positive and fundamental changes in the way in which the larger
society views and treats the Negro." K. Clark, supra, at 51.
19821
142 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 17
racial contacts of minority group members. This, in turn, im-
pedes assimilation into the economic, social, and political
mainstream of society and ensures that the victims of racism are
seen and see themselves as outsiders.42 Indeed, racism can be
seen as a force used by the majority to preserve an economically
advantageous position for themselves.4 3 But when individuals
cannot or choose not to contribute their talents to a social system
because they are demoralized or angry, or when they are actively
prevented by racist institutions from fully contributing their
talents, society as a whole loses.
Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, racism and racial
labeling have an even greater impact on children than on adults.
The effects of racial labeling are discernible early in life;4 at a
young age, minority children exhibit self-hatred because of their
color, and majority children learn to associate dark skin with
undesirability and ugliness45 A few examples readily reveal the
psychological damage of racial stigmatization on children. When
presented with otherwise identical dolls, a black child preferred
the light-skinned one as a friend; she said that the dark-skinned
one looked dirty or "not nice."'' Another child hated her skin
color so intensely that she "vigorously lathered her arms and face
with soap in an effort to wash away the dirt."'47 She told the ex-
perimenter, "This morning I scrubbed and scrubbed and it came
almost white. ' 48 When asked about making a little girl out of
42 See S. Hayakawa, supra note 23, at 12, 78.
4 See Krogman, An Anthropologist Looks at Race, 7 Intercultural Educ.
News 1 (1945), reprinted in Anatomy of Racial Intolerance, supra note 38, at 20,
25; Mekeel, Race Relations, 27 Mental Hygiene 177 (1945), reprinted in Anatomy
of Racial Intolerance, supra note 38, at 81, 87, 89 [hereinafter cited as Mekeel];
H. Powdermaker, Prejudice in the World Today, in Probing Our Prejudices
(1944), reprinted in Anatomy of Racial Intolerance, supra note 38, at 27, 27; Red-
field, What We Do Know About Race, 57 Sci. Monthly 193 (1943), reprinted in
Anatomy of Racial Intolerance, supra note 38, at 7, 11, 13 [hereinafter cited as
Redfield]. See generally 0. Cox, supra note 17; W. Wilson, Power, Racism, and
Privilege (1973).
"See M. Goodman, supra note 24.
41 See id. at 36-60. See also G. Allport, supra note 11, at 289-301.
4M. Goodman, supra note 24, at 55.
"1 Id. at 56.
48 Id. at 58.
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clay, a black child said that the group should use the white clay
rather than the brown "because it will make a better girl."49
When asked to describe dolls which had the physical
characteristics of black people, young children chose adjectives
such as "rough, funny, stupid, silly, smelly, stinky, dirty. 510
Three-fourths of a group of four-year-old black children favored
white play companions; 51 over half felt themselves inferior to
whites. 52 Some engaged in denial or falsification.
53
B. The Harms of Racial Insults
Immediate mental or emotional distress is the most obvious
direct harm caused by a racial insult. Without question, mere
words, whether racial or otherwise, can cause mental, emotional,
or even physical54 harm to their target, especially if delivered in
front of others5  or by a person in a position of authority. 56
Racial insults, relying as they do on the unalterable fact of the
victim's race and on the history of slavery and race discrimination
in this country, have an even greater potential for harm than
other insults.
Although the emotional damage caused is variable and
depends on many factors, only one of which is the outrageous-
ness of the insult, a racial insult is always a dignitary affront, a
direct violation of the victim's right to be treated respectfully.
Our moral and legal systems recognize the principle that individu-
als are entitled to treatment that does not denigrate their humani-
49 Id.
50 Id.
S1 See id. at 83.
52 See id. at 86.
51 See id. at 60-73.
4 E.g., Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 (defendant falsely told
plaintiff her husband had had both legs broken in an accident; plaintiff suffered
permanent physical harm).
11 E.g., Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967).
See infra text accompanying notes 95-102.
6 E.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 88 (1970); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach, Inc., 88 Wah. 2d 735, 565 P.2d
1173 (1977)(en banc). See supra text accompanying notes 1-4; infra text accom-
panying notes 113-18.
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ty through disrespect for their privacy or moral worth.17 This
ideal has a high place in our traditions, 8 finding expression in
such principles as universal suffrage, 9 the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, 60 the protection of the fourth
amendment against unreasonable searches, 6' and the abolition
of slavery.62 A racial insult is a serious transgression of this
principle because it derogates by race,63 a characteristic central
to one's self-image.
The wrong of this dignitary affront consists of the expression
of a judgment that the victim of the racial slur is entitled to less
than that to which all other citizens are entitled. Verbal tags pro-
vide a convenient means of categorization so that individuals may
be treated as members of a class and assumed to share all the
negative attitudes imputed to the class.64 Verbal tags thus make
it easier for their users to justify their own superior position with
respect to others. 65 Racial insults also serve to keep the victim
11 Damages for mental or emotional distress are awarded in order to remedy
invasion of the interest in dignity in actions for assault, battery, malicious pro-
secution, invasion of privacy, and alienation of affections. See D. Dobbs, Hand-
book on the Law of Remedies 528 (1973).
S" See, e.g., L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law ch. 15 (1978)("Rights of
Privacy and Personhood").
11 See, e.g., id. ch. 13 ("Rights of Political Participation").
0 U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
61 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
6 U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
6 See Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Respon-
sibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653, 668, 672 (1975)(classification
on basis of color and other involuntary characteristics violates our conception of
"the good society and... of the proper role of government').
6 See F. Wertham, A Sign for Cain 89 (1966)(racial prejudice depersonalizes
the victim, thereby rationalizing violence and inhumane treatment).
65 See J. Kovel, supra note 20, at 132; C. Woodward, The Strange Career of
Jim Crow xii (Galaxy ed. 1964); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Spanish-Surnamed American Employment in the Southwest 77 (1974)(use of terms
such as "Spick" and "Greaser" facilitated Anglo assertion of cultural and economic
superiority, as those so designated were not considered proper members of domi-
nant society).
See also Famous Mexican Americans 54 (C. Newlon ed. 1972)(interview with
Cesar Chavez):
[In Brawley] the cops wouldn't let us into Anglo Town, but there
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compliant. 6 Such dignitary affronts are certainly no less harm-
ful than others recognized by the law. Clearly, a society whose
public law recognizes harm in the stigma of separate but equal
schooling 67 and the potential offensiveness of the required
display of a state motto on automobile license plates, 68 and
whose private law sees actionable conduct in an unwanted kiss69
or the forcible removal of a person's hat,7 0 should also recognize
the dignitary harm inflicted by a racial insult.
The need for legal redress for victims also is underscored by
the fact that racial insults are intentional acts. The intentionality
of racial insults is obvious: what other purpose could the insult
serve? There can be little doubt that the dignitary affront of
racial insults, except perhaps those that are overheard, is inten-
tional and therefore most reprehensible. Most people today know
that certain words are offensive and only calculated to wound. 7'
No other use remains for such words as "nigger," "wop," "spick,"
or "kike."
was a diner [with a "whites only" sign] right on the line, kind of, and
everybody talked about how it was supposed to have beautiful ham-
burgers.... [Chavez] said, "Two hamburgers, please." The [counter] girl
said, "What's the matter, can't you read? Damn dumb Mex."
She and her boyfriend laughed, and we ran out. Richard was curs-
ing them, but I was the one who had spoken to them and I was crying.
That laugh rang in my ears for twenty years. It seemed to cut us out
of the human race.
6 See Mekeel, supra note 43, at 87, 89 (racism as a means of protecting
competitive advantages).
7 See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown turn-
ed, clearly, on the stigmatizing effect-the indignity or affront of separate
schools-because by hypothesis the schools were "equal." See id. at 492.
"Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)(considerations of privacy and
autonomy held to prevent New Hampshire from punishing citizens for putting
tape over state motto "Live Free or Die" on license plates).
69 See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 10, at 36 & n.85 (4th
ed. 1971).
11 See id. § 10, at 36 & n.78.
' See G. Allport, supra note 11, at 177 (When a speaker uses terms like
"nigger," "spick," or "wop," "we can be almost certain that the speaker intends
not only to characterize the person's membership, but also to disparage and re-
ject him.")(emphasis in original). See generally S. Hayakawa, supra note 23, at
25 (racial and religious classifications serve no nondiscriminatory, predictive ends).
1982]
146 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 17
In addition to the harms of immediate emotional distress and
infringement of dignity, racial insults inflict psychological harm
upon the victim. Racial slurs may cause long-term emotional pain
because they draw upon and intensify the effects of the
stigmatization, labeling, and disrespectful treatment that the vic-
tim has previously undergone. Social scientists who have studied
the effects of racism have found that speech that communicates
low regard for an individual because of race "tends to create in
the victim those very traits of 'inferiority' that it ascribes to
him."' Moreover, "even in the absence of more objective forms
of discrimination-poor schools, menial jobs, and substandard
housing-traditional stereotypes about the low ability and apathy
of Negroes and other minorities can operate as 'self-fulfilling
prophecies."' 73 These stereotypes, portraying members of a
minority group as stupid, lazy, dirty, or untrustworthy, are often
communicated either explicitly or implicitly through racial
insults.
Because they constantly hear racist messages, minority
children, not surprisingly, come to question their competence, in-
telligence, and worth. Much of the blame for the formation of
these attitudes lies squarely on value-laden words, epithets, and
racial names. 74 These are the materials out of which each child
"grows his own set of thoughts and feelings about race."7 If the
majority "defines them and their parents as no good, inadequate,
dirty, incompetent, and stupid," the child will find it difficult not
to accept those judgments.76
Victims of racial invective have few means of coping with the
harms caused by the insults. Physical attacks are of course for-
bidden. "More speech" frequently is useless because it may pro-
voke only further abuse or because the insulter is in a position of
authority over the victim. Complaints to civil rights organizations
12 M. Deutsch, I. Katz & A. Jensen, Social Class, Race and Psychological
Development 175 (1968).
73 Id.
74 See G. Allport, supra note 11, at vi; M. Goodman, supra note 24, at 73,
127-31, 135-36, 159-60, 163-64, 211, 232, 238-39; deHuszar, Preface, in Anatomy
of Racial Intolerance, supra note 38, at 3, 3; Redfield, supra note 43, at 11.
1S M. Goodman, supra note 24, at 246.
76 K. Keniston, All Our Children 33 (1977).
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also are meaningless unless they are followed by action to punish
the offender.77 Adoption of a "they're well meaning but ig-
norant" attitude78 is another impotent response in light of the in-
sidious psychological harms of racial slurs. When victimized by
racist language, victims must be able to threaten and institute
legal action, thereby relieving the sense of helplessness that leads
to psychological harm and communicating to the perpetrator and
to society that such abuse will not be tolerated, either by its vic-
tims or by the courts.
Minority children possess even fewer means for coping with
racial insults than do adults. "A child who finds himself rejected
and attacked ... is not likely to develop dignity and poise....
On the contrary he develops defenses. Like a dwarf in a world of
menacing giants, he cannot fight on equal terms. 179 The child
who is the victim of belittlement can react with only two unsuc-
cessful strategies, hostility or passivity. Aggressive reactions can
lead to consequences which reinforce the harm caused by the in-
sults; children who behave aggressively in school are marked by
their teachers as troublemakers, adding to the children's aliena-
tion and sense of rejection. 0 Seemingly passive reactions have
no better results; children who are passive toward their insulters
turn the aggressive response on themselves;8 robbed of con-
fidence and motivation, these children withdraw into moroseness,
fantasy, and fear. 82
n See, e.g., J. Comer & A. Poussaint, Black Child Care 226 (1976).
71 See S. Hayakawa, supra note 23, at 80.
71 G. Allport, supra note 11, at 139.
"See generally H. James, Children in Trouble 278 (1970); J. Kozol, Death
at an Early Age (1967); Vredeval, Embarrassment and Ridicule, Nat'l Educ. A.
J., Sept. 1963, at 17. Black teenagers have a one in ten chance of getting into
trouble with the law and are five times more likely to be murdered than white
teenagers. See L.A. Times, supra note 32. Black children are suspended from
schools at twice the rate of white children. See id.
"See M. McDonald, Not by the Color of Their Skin 131 (1970).
82 See generally K. Clark, supra note 18, at 65 (sense of inferiority is the
most serious race-related injury to black child); M. Deutsch, The Disadvantaged
Child 106 (1968)("[B]lack children tend to be more passive, more fearful and more
diseuphoric than white.").
Deutsch has produced evidence to show that personality traits of defeatism
and self-rejection in minority children are to a significant extent independent of
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It is, of course, impossible to predict the degree of deterrence
a cause of action in tort would create. However, as Professor van
den Berghe has written, "for most people living in racist societies
racial prejudice is merely a special kind of convenient rationaliza-
tion for rewarding behavior."83 In other words, in racist societies
"most members of the dominant group will exhibit both prejudice
and discrimination,"84 but only in conforming to social norms.85
Thus, "[W]hen social pressures and rewards for racism are ab-
sent, racial bigotry is more likely to be restricted to people for
whom prejudice fulfills a psychological 'need.' In such a tolerant
milieu prejudiced persons may even refrain from discriminating
behavior to escape social disapproval."8 Increasing the cost of
racial insults thus would certainly decrease their frequency. Laws
will never prevent violations altogether, but they will deter
"whoever is deterrable."87
Because most citizens comply with legal rules, and this com-
pliance in turn "reinforce[s] their own sentiments toward
conformity,"88 a tort action for racial insults would discourage
such harmful activity through the teaching function of the law.89
income level. In a study comparing aptitude scores and self-image ratings among
groups of low-income white children and similar black children, it was found that
the latter had lower scores on aptitude tests and more negative self-images. See
M. Deutsch, supra, at 106. Another study found that although I.Q. levels increased
with education and prestige ratings of occupations of the parents of both white
and black children, the gains were considerably less for black children. See id.
at 295. These studies seem to show that although poverty has a negative effect
on a child's self-image and academic performance, the racial factor is even more
significant. See also Kacser, Background Paper, in Subcomm. on Executive
Reorganization and Government Research of the Senate Comm. on Government
Operations, Government Research on the Problems of Children and Youth:
Background Papers Prepared for the 1970-71 White House Conference on
Children and Youth, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 15 (1971)(children who suffer from
discrimination become convinced they are inferior and unworthy of help or af-
fection, and respond by aggression, neurotic repression, withdrawal and fantasy).
83 P. van den Berghe, Race and Racism 21 (2d ed. 1978).
84 Id. at 20.
85 See id. at 21.
86 Id. at 20.
'7 G. Aliport, supra note 11, at 472.
88 R. Williams, supra note 39, at 73.
89 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)(Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)(teaching role of the law); M. King, I Have a Dream: The Text of the
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The establishment of a legal norm "creates a public conscience
and a standard for expected behavior that check overt signs of
prejudice."0 Legislation aims first at controlling only the acts
that express undesired attitudes. But "when expression changes,
thoughts too in the long run are likely to fall into line."'"
"Laws ... restrain the middle range of mortals who need them as
a mentor in molding their habits."92 Thus, "If we create institu-
tional arrangements in which exploitative behaviors are no longer
reinforced, we will then succeed in changing attitudes [that
underlie these behaviors]. '  Because racial attitudes of white
Americans "typically follow rather than precede actual institu-
tional [or legal] alteration,"94 a tort for racial slurs is a promis-
ing vehicle for the eradication of racism.
II. Legal Protection from Racial Insults
The psychological, sociological, and political repercussions
of the racial insult demonstrate the need for judicial relief. Part
II(A) will examine the protection from racial insults afforded by
current doctrine. The remainder of this section will consider the
objections likely to be raised against an independent tort action
for racial slurs. Part II(B) will examine objections arising from
tort law, and Part II(C) will consider first amendment objections.
Speech Delivered August 28, 1963, at the Lincoln Memorial, Washington, D.C.
(John Henry & Mary Louise Bryant Found. 1963)(excerpted in Newsweek, Sept.
9, 1963, at 21)(law as agent of change in moral consciousness). See generally
Andenaes, GeneralPrevention-llusion or Reality?, 43 J. Crim. L. Criminology
& Police Sci. 176, 179-81 (1952)(definition of concept of general prevention);
Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev.
949, 950-51 (1966)(existence of a legal norm can habituate persons to obey the
law without conscious fear or thought).
90 G. Allport, supra note 11, at 470.
91 Id.
9 Id. at 439. See also G. Allport, Prejudice: A Problem in Psychological
and Social Causation 4, Supp. Ser. No. 4, J. Soc. Issues (1950)(examination of
prejudice as a mode of mental functioning).
93 H. Triandis, The Impact of Social Change on Attitudes, in Attitudes,
Conflict and Social Changes 132 (1972)(quoted in Katz, Preface, Toward the
Elimination of Racism 8 (P. Katz ed. 1976)).
9 G. Myrdal, supra note 41, at 20 (fallacy of theory that law cannot change
custom).
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A. Current Legal Protection from Racial Insults
Many of the arguments for a cause of action for racial in-
sults are similar to the policies underlying causes of action for
assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
defamation, and various statutory and constitutional causes of
action. However, each of these doctrines has limitations which
render it an unreliable means of redress for the victims of racial
insults.
1. Assault and Battery
In Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc.,95 the plaintiff, a
mathematician attending a NASA convention in Texas, was ac-
costed by a white restaurant employee while waiting in a cafeteria
line. The employee snatched an empty plate from the plaintiff's
hand and told him in a loud voice that he, a "Negro," could not
eat in that cafeteria.96 The plaintiff did not allege that he was
actually touched, or that he feared physical injury, but rather that
he was "highly embarrassed and hurt" by the employee's actions
in the presence of the plaintiff's associates.9 Although the jury
awarded him $900, the trial judge denied any recovery.98 The
Texas Court of Appeals affirmed,99 ruling that there had been
neither a battery nor an assault'00 and that under Texas law
mental anguish without physical injury does not support a claim
for damages in battery. The court reached this result even though
the jury had found humiliation, indignity, and wanton disregard
of the plaintiff's feelings.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, finding that the plaintiff
could recover under the rubric of battery because the waiter's
9' 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967).
96 Id. at 628-29.
"Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 414 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967).
98 414 S.W.2d at 775.
99 Id. at 776 (citing Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81




seizure of the plate supplied the required offensive touching. 01
The court, further, held that because battery is a tort designed to
protect dignity as well as physical security, the plaintiff was not
required to show physical harm in order to recover damages.'0
The holding in Fisher that the violent snatching of a plate
from the plaintiffs hand constituted an offensive touching is not
remarkable.103 But Fisher does indicate recognition by the Texas
Supreme Court that racial insults and overt acts of discrimination
can cause mental suffering and humiliation. Moreover, the facts
of Fisher illustrate the inadequacies of the doctrines of assault
and battery in protecting such a plaintiff. If the plate had not
been snatched from plaintiffs hand, but he had been insulted un-
til he put down the plate and left, or before he picked up the
plate, he could not have recovered in battery. And because the
employee's words did not put the plaintiff in fear of physical in-
jury or touching, the plaintiff could not have recovered in
assault.'°4
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Despite the ever-growing acceptance of intentional infliction
of emotional distress as an independent tort, 05 the perennial
fear of a flood of fraudulent claims continues to mold the doc-
trine. The Second Restatement of Torts, for example, limits
recovery to "severe emotional distress" caused by "extreme and
outrageous conduct.""° California permits recovery for physical
injury to the plaintiff if the physical injury was foreseeable,' °7
101 424 S.W.2d at 630.
102 Id.
" 3 See W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 9, at 34 (integrity of person includes "all
those things which are in contact or connected with it").
"4 See also Anderson v. Pantages Theater Co., 114 Wash. 24, 194 P. 813
(1921)(black theatergoer told "none of [his] kind of people" could sit in box seats
and physically pushed through lobby and out of theater).
"0' See W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 12, at 62.
106 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). Some states have adopted the
Restatement view. See, e.g., Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 60, 530 P.2d
291, 296 (1975).
1o" State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 336-37, 240
P.2d 282, 285 (1952)(en banc).
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but, in the absence of physical harm, requires that the invasion of
plaintiff's mental tranquillity be "extreme and outrageous. '
Utah requires that the distress be severe, that either the defendant
have acted with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress or the
distress be reasonably foreseeable, and that the defendant's ac-
tions be outrageous and intolerable. 109 In Texas, the emotional
distress must be accompanied by physical injury."0
Yet, in addition to Contreras,"' courts on at least three oc-
casions have upheld causes of action or verdicts for black plain-
tiffs in cases which stemmed in large part from racial insults."
2
Two of these cases are from California. In the first, Alcorn v.
Anbro Engineering, Inc.,'" a black truck driver advised his
supervisor that the supervisor had instructed another employee to
violate union rules. The supervisor responded, "You goddam
'niggers' are not going to tell me about the rules. I don't want any
'niggers' working for me. I am getting rid of all the 'niggers'...
you're fired."" 4 Alcorn alleged that he had been neither rude nor
insubordinate and that the supervisor's conduct was intentional,
0I Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498, 468 P.2d 216, 218, 86
Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 (1970).
'0 Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961).
10 Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
"i The early case law of intentional infliction is indicative of the lack of sen-
sitivity courts have shown to the feelings of black people. For example, an early
Texas case held that the plaintiff, a white woman, stated a cause of action for
intentionally inflicted mental distress when the defendant came into her yard,
knowing she was pregnant, and assaulted two blacks, using profane language and
causing the plaintiff to miscarry. The court cited an earlier case in which the defen-
dant had shot and killed a dog in the presence of the plaintiff, causing the woman
to miscarry. Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 215-16, 13 S.W. 59, 59-60 (1890)(citing
Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 40, 30 N.W. 435 (1886)). The Texas opinion con-
tains no mention of any right of action on the part of the blacks. See also Richard-
son v. State, 23 Ala. App. 260, 123 So. 283 (1929)(black defendant charged with
"assault to rape;" court said, "What would be a... mere assault as between per-
sons of the same or similar social standing would become of much graver mo-
ment as between persons of a different social status and of different races.").
',3 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
" Id. at 496-97, 468 P.2d at 217, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 89. The firm's secretary
later "ratified" the act by firing the plaintiff. Id. at 497, 468 P.2d at 217, 86 Cal.
Rptr. at 89.
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malicious, and intended to cause humiliation and mental anguish.
The court held these allegations sufficient to state a cause of ac-
tion for "extreme and outrageous" intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress."' 5 In so holding, the court emphasized the
employee-employer relationship between the parties," 6 the plain-
tiff's allegation of particular susceptibility to emotional
distress,"17 and developments in social consciousness that render
the term "nigger" particularly offensive." 8
In the second case, Agarwal v. Johnson,"9 the plaintiff, a
native of East India, sued his former employer and two of his
former supervisors for repeated harassment. The plaintiff
testified that on one occasion one of his supervisors had said to
him, "You black nigger, member of an inferior race, get out and
do it."'20 The jury awarded the plaintiff general and punitive
damages, and the state supreme court held that the evidence was
sufficient to support the verdict for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.12'
Because the question of whether the defendant's conduct is
"extreme and outrageous" must be answered on a case-by-case
basis, and because the racial insults in these two cases were linked
with other reprehensible conduct, including the unjustified ter-
mination of the plaintiff's employment, it is impossible to know
whether the racial slurs were decisive factors in Alcorn and Agar-
wal. Courts always have been extremely reluctant to impose
liability on the basis of words alone.'2 However, the Alcorn
"15 Id. at 498, 468 P.2d at 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90. See supra text accom-
panying notes 107-08.
116 Id. at 498 & n.2, 468 P.2d at 218 & n.2, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90 & n.2 (status
as an employee entitles plaintiff to greater degree of protection than a stranger).
11 Id. at 498 & n.3, 468 P.2d at 218 & n.3, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90 & n.3. The
court adverted to the susceptibility of blacks to emotional distress from
discriminatory conduct. Id. at 498 n.3, 468 P.2d at 218 n.3, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90
n.3 (citing Colley, Civil Actions for Damages Arising Out of Violations of Civil
Rights, 17 Hastings L.J. 189, 201 (1965-66)). See infra text accompanying notes
221-22.
"1 2 Cal. 3d at 499 n.4, 468 P.2d at 219 n.4, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90 n.4.
"9 25 Cal. 3d 932, 603 P.2d 58, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1979).
120 Id. at 941, 603 P.2d at 64, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
121 Id. at 947, 603 P.2d at 67, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
1' See W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 10, at 39-40.
1982]
154 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 17
court left open the question whether "mere insulting language,
without more," could constitute "extreme outrage,"'" and the
Agarwal court stated that the plaintiff "presented substantial
evidence that [one supervisor's] use of the racial epithet was
outrageous." ' 4
In Wiggs v. Courshon,125 the plaintiffs, a recent law
graduate and his family, became engaged in an argument with a
waitress serving them in the restaurant of the hotel in which they
were staying while on vacation. The waitress said, "You can't talk
to me like that, you black son-of-a-bitch. I will kill you." 6
Later, she was overheard shouting repeatedly, "[They are
nothing but a bunch of niggers."' 7 The case was tried on the
theory of assault, although the plaintiff also alleged mental
anguish and emotional distress. At the close of the evidence,
however, it was apparent that the plaintiffs were never reasonably
in fear of physical injury. And under the controlling Florida law,
plaintiffs may recover for intentional infliction of emotional
distress only when that distress is "severe."12
Nevertheless, the federal district court upheld the jury's ver-
dict for the plaintiff on the basis of dictum in the controlling
Florida Supreme Court decision, Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of
Florida, Inc.129 In that case, the plaintiff, a customer in a super-
market, asked a clerk the price of an item the clerk was marking.
The clerk replied, "If you want to know the price, you'll have to
find out the best way you can ... you stink to me."'3  The
plaintiff sought to recover for her ensuing emotional distress and
"heart attack and aggravation of pre-existing heart disease.''
The court held that these allegations did not state a cause of ac-
tion because the "unwarranted intrusion [into the plaintiffs men-
tal tranquillity] must be calculated to cause 'severe emotional
'" 2 Cal. 3d at 499 & n.5, 468 P.2d at 219 & n.5, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 91 & n.5.
224 Id. at 947, 603 P.2d at 67, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
11 355 F. Supp. 206 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
'1 Id. at 208.
127 Id.
2 Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958).
129 Id.
M' Id. at 396-97.
M Id. at 396.
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distress' to a person of ordinary sensibilities, in the absence of
special knowledge or notice."'' Nevertheless, the court noted
that a "broader rule has been developed" for "offense reasonably
suffered by a patron from insult by a servant or employee of a
carrier, hotel, theater, . . . [or] telegraph office."'3 It was this
dictum on which the Wiggs court grounded liability. 34
Wiggs exemplifies the shortcomings of the doctrine of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress as a means for redressing
racial insults. The jury was eager to find for the plaintiffs, award-
ing them $25,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 35 But
the judge was forced to ground liability on dictum which had
never before been cited in the state 36 and which had not been
suggested to the court by either party. 37 Most importantly, had
the plaintiff's dispute developed with another customer rather
than an employee, no recovery would have been possible. The in-
jury arguably is lesser when the perpetrator is simply another
customer, but in Wiggs the plaintiffs' humiliation before the
other diners would have been just as great, and their vacation just
as ruined.
Of course, the plaintiffs did win in Contreras, Alcorn, Agar-
wal, and Wiggs. But in at least two recent cases 38  based
substantially on racial insults, the plaintiffs lost because the
defendants' actions were not sufficiently culpable. In Irving v.
J.L. Marsh, Inc.,39 the plaintiff, a black architecture student,
returned certain merchandise he had purchased to the defendant's
store. In order to obtain a refund, he was required to sign a slip
on the top of which defendant's employee had written, "Arrogant
112 Id. at 398.
13 Id.
13 355 F. Supp. at 209-10 & n.3.
131 Id. at 210. The trial judge reduced this amount to $2500. Id. at 211.
136 Id. at 209.
137 Id.
138 See also De La Ysla v. Public Theatres Corp., 82 Utah 598, 26 P.2d 818
(1933)(Filipino plaintiff alleged that theater would not permit him to sit in seats
on lower floor for which he had purchased tickets; held, action sounds in con-
tract, not tort, and if plaintiff wins on merits he is entitled to judgment for pur-
chase price of tickets, $1.40).
139 46 Ill. App. 3d 162, 360 N.E.2d 983 (1977).
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Nigger refuses exchange-says he doesn't like products."'" The
court held that such conduct was not "sufficiently severe""14 for
the plaintiff to recover. Similarly, in Bradshaw v. Swagerty,1
42
the plaintiff, a young black man, had been invited to the office of
the defendant, a lawyer, to discuss accounts allegedly owed the
defendant's client by the plaintiff and his brother. The conversa-
tion became heated, and the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
called him "nigger," a claim that the defendant apparently did not
deny.Y3 The court held that such epithets are "'mere insults' of
the kind which must be tolerated in our roughened society" and
affirmed summary judgment for the defendant. 4
The Irving court appeared sympathetic to the plaintiff,
noting that "[w]hile the derogatory and highly offensive character
of defendant's actions is not condoned by this court, the law, in
its present state, does not permit recovery for the humiliation
plaintiff was forced to endure."' 45 Arguably, then, the court's
failure to impose liability resulted from the ever-present judicial
fear of encouraging fraudulent claims and a flood of litigation.
The court's reluctance to redress the plaintiff's injuries is symp-
tomatic of the inadequacy of the tort for intentional infliction of
emotional distress in such cases. One of the comments in the Sec-
ond Restatement of Torts section on intentional infliction states
in part, "The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, in-
dignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other
trivialities .... There must still be freedom to express an unflat-
tering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which
irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.'
4 6
'4 Id. at 164, 360 N.E.2d at 985.
t4! Id. at 167, 360 N.E.2d at 986.
141 1 Kan. 2d 213, 563 P.2d 511 (1977).
141 See id. at 214, 563 P.2d at 513 ("Defendant admitted using the term
'bastard,' but denied that he 'directly' called plaintiff a 'nigger.'").
'" Id. at 216, 563 P.2d at 514 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46
comment d (1965)). See infra note 146 & accompanying text.
"1' 46 I11. App. 3d at 167, 360 N.E.2d at 986 (citing Slocum v. Food Fair
Stores of Florida, Inc., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958)).
'14 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment d (1965). Comment d states
in part:
The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. The rough
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What courts have thus far failed to recognize is that racial insults
are in no way comparable to statements such as, "You are a God
damned woman and a God damned liar," which the Restatement
gives as an example of a "mere insult." 47 Racial insults are dif-
ferent qualitatively because they conjure up the entire history of
racial discrimination in this country.14 No one would argue that
slavery can be characterized as a "petty oppression" or lynch
mobs as "mere annoyances," but thus far courts generally have
not recognized the gravity of racial insults within the rubric of the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Only an in-
dependent tort for racial insults can fully take into account the
unique, powerfully evocative nature of racial insults and the in-
sidious harms they inflict.
3. Defamation
In both Irving149 and Bradshaw,'50 the plaintiffs also pled a
cause of action in defamation, and both lost on that claim. In
neither case did the plaintiff allege special damages, and thus
both the Irving' and Bradshaw5 2 courts ruled that the words
edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and
in the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to
be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional
acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion
for the law to intervene in every case where some one's [sic] feelings are
hurt. There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and
some safety valve must be left through which irascible tempers may blow
off relatively harmless steam.
47 See id. illustration 4 (such an insult, made over the phone to a telephone
operator, which causes severe emotional distress, is "not so outrageous or extreme"
as to render the speaker liable).
148 See Bradshaw, 1 Kan. 2d at 215, 563 P.2d at 514 ("The term 'nigger' is
one of insult, abuse and belittlement harking back to slavery days.").
119 See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.
15 See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
5 46 Ill. App. 3d at 165-66, 360 N.E.2d at 985. The court also held that the
word "nigger" did not impute to the plaintiff an inability to perform the duties
of his chosen profession, one of the categories of defamation per se in Illinois.
46 Ill. App. 3d at 166, 360 N.E.2d at 985.
"152 1 Kan. 2d at 214-15, 563 P.2d at 514.
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alleged did not fit into any of the recognized categories of
defamation per se. The Bradshaw court, however, did note that
"[t]he term 'nigger' is one of insult, abuse and belittlement hark-
ing back to slavery days. Its use is resented, and rightly so. It
nevertheless is not within any category recognized as slanderous
per se. 1 113 Yet, interestingly, in at least three older cases, white
plaintiffs were permitted to sue for defamation defendants who
indicated that the plaintiffs were black. 54
It should not be surprising that defamation has failed to pro-
tect the victims of racial insults. "Defamation" is "an invasion of
the interest in reputation and good name,' ' 5  although the law
protects only victims of false defamatory statements. In contrast,
the maker of a racial insult invades the victim's interest in emo-
tional tranquillity. A third party who learned that a person was
the victim of a racial insult, but did not know the victim, would
probably conclude that the victim is a member of a particular
racial minority. But if this conclusion is true, the victim cannot
recover because no falsehood has occurred.156 And whether or
not the conclusion is true, it is not desirable that the law view
,"3 Id. at 215, 563 P.2d at 514. Cf. W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 111, at 737
("It must be confessed at the beginning that there is a great deal of the law of
defamation which makes no sense."). See also Mitchell v. Tribune Co., 343 Ill.
App. 446, 99 N.E.2d 397 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952)(upholding
dismissal of complaint alleging that newspaper called plaintiff "Chink" and
"Negro" on ground that such did not constitute defamation per se and special
damages were not alleged; plaintiff's race not indicated); Davis v. Meyer, 115 Nebr.
251, 212 N.W. 435 (1927)(holding that calling plaintiff "half-breed Mexican" is
not defamatory).
,14 Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co., 190 Ala. 243, 67 So. 577 (1915); Natchez
Times Publishing Co. v. Dunigan, 221 Miss. 320, 72 So. 2d 681 (1954); Bowen
v. Independent Publishing Co., 230 S.C. 509, 96 S.E.2d 564 (1957). See also Afro-
American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1966)held, white plain-
tiff defamed by black newspaper which described plaintiff as bigoted); Sharp v.
Bussey, 137 Fla. 96, 187 So. 779 (1939)(upholding jury verdict, although limiting
damages to $10,000, against defendant who told others that white plaintiff had
danced with black women); Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 169
Ky. 64, 183 S.W. 269 (1916)(held, allegation that newspaper falsely reported that
plaintiff employed black foreman to supervise white female employees stated cause
of action in libel).
"I W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 111, at 737.
,16 See id. § 116, at 796-99.
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membership in a racial minority as damaging to a person's
reputation, even if some members of society consider it so.
4. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
Victims of racial insults who have sued state officials under
section 19831 7 have achieved differing results. In Harris v. Har-
vey, "I for example, a black police officer sued a white judge for
a "racially motivated campaign to discredit and damage"'59 the
police officer and have him relieved of his job. As part of his ex-
traordinary campaign,' ° the judge had referred to the officer as
a "black bastard."'61 In affirming the jury's award of $260,000
in compensatory and punitive damages and the trial court's award
of attorney's fees, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
"such an intentional tort inspired by racial animus and
perpetrated under color of state law constitutes a denial of equal
protection."' 6 The court also ruled that the judge's use of the
power and prestige of his office brought his acts under color of
law, even though the judge's campaign was not within the scope
of his judicial duties, and thus the defense of judicial immunity
was unavailable.' 63
In contrast, in Johnson v. Hackett 64 a district court ruled
that the complaint failed to state a claim under section 1983. The
plaintiff alleged that on a certain evening two uniformed police
officers on patrol threatened to fight a group of blacks and said
that they would return later that evening. The officers did return,
one asking, "Where are the night fighters?," the other asking,
"What's a dead nigger anyway?' ' 6  The next day, with the two
officers again in uniform and on patrol, one of the officers called
the plaintiff a "Chinese nigger." The plaintiff responded "with a
15742 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
51 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976).
1"9 Id. at 338.
160 See id. at 333-36.
161 Id. at 333.
162 Id. at 338.
163 Id. at 337.
64 284 F. Supp 933 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
161 Id. at 936.
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similar expression, but without racial overtones."' 66 A third of-
ficer then asked the two officers if they had provoked the expres-
sion. After they replied that they had not, the third officer ar-
rested the plaintiff for disorderly conduct.
The court held that there had been no infringement of the
right to freedom from unlawful arrest and that the plaintiff's
other alleged right, the "right to dignity," was not constitutionally
protected. 67 The court also reached the highly questionable con-
clusion that the two police officers had not acted under color of
law because they were not authorized to call anyone insulting
names. Reasoning that "the purely personal nature of the offer
[to fight] is emphasized by the allegation that, before the
challenge was issued, [the officer] removed his gun belt, laying
aside, as it were, the symbol or 'pretense' of police authority,'
1 68
the court concluded, "It is the nature of the act performed, not
the clothing of the actor or even the status of being on duty, or
off duty, which determines whether the officer has acted under
color of law."'
1 69
The requirements of section 1983 -that the right infringed be
granted by the federal constitution or laws and that the official be
acting under color of law-present formidable hurdles for victims
of racial insults. 70 The campaign of racial vilification in
Harris7' was so extreme and unlikely to be repeated that one
must conclude that the outcome in Johnson, not Harris, will
emerge as the usual result.
If this is the case, it will be in sharp contrast to other areas
in which the law increasingly is recognizing that the use of racial
language by government officials is intolerable. The United States
16 Id.
,67 Id. at 938-40. The plaintiff did not allege a denial of equal protection.
' Id. at 937 (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945)). It
is telling that the court considered the officer's gun, rather than his uniform or
badge, or the fact that he was on duty, as "the symbol.., of police authority."
169 Id.
110 See generally EI-Em Band of Porno Indians v. 49th Dist. Agricultural
Fair Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1973)("right [of Indian tribe] to be free
from being made a public object of ridicule through use of a symbol which
derogatorily depicts their race" not guaranteed by federal constitution).
' See supra note 160 & accompanying text.
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Supreme Court has found constitutional error in a contempt cita-
tion issued against a black witness who refused to answer ques-
tions until the adverse attorney addressed her as "Miss Hamilton"
rather than "Mary."'' And the Minnesota Supreme Court has
held:
We cannot regard use of the term 'nigger' in reference to
a black youth as anything but discrimination against that
youth based on his race .... When a racial epithet is
used to refer to a [black] person ... an adverse distinc-
tion is implied between that person and other persons
not of his race. The use of the term 'nigger' has no place
in the civil treatment of a citizen by a public official. We
hold that use of this term by police officers coupled with
all of the other uncontradicted acts described herein con-
stituted discrimination because of race.173
Similarly, courts and administrative bodies have imposed duties
to avoid racial language on prison officials, 74 police officers, 75
and school boards. 76 In 1980 the San Francisco Civil Service
' Exparte Hamilton, 376 U.S. 650 (1964)(per curiam), rev'g 275 Ala. 574,
156 So. 2d 926 (1963).
As this Article was going to press, the California Supreme Court ruled that
a judge's use of the racial terms "jig," "dark boy," "colored boy," "nigger," "coon,"
"Amos and Andy," and "jungle bunny," in reference to blacks, and "cute little
tamale," "spick," and "bean," in reference to Hispanics, constituted conduct
"prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judical office into
disrepute." Judge Mosk, dissenting, said that although he was morally offended
by the judge's remarks, the remarks fell within the judge's right to freedom of
expression. See San Francisco Chronicle, May 21, 1981, at 1, col. 4.
7 City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 307 Minn. 80, 82-83, 239 N.W.2d
197, 200 (1976)(crowd of people observed police making arrest; police used dogs
to disperse crowd; dog bit hand of man next to black youth, then leapt at black
youth who struck it with rolled-up poster; black youth arrested, dragged face down
to police car, called "nigger" by police). See also City of Minneapolis v. State,
310 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Minn. S. Ct. 1981)(Minnesota antidiscrimination statute
prohibits police officer calling white person "nigger lover").
174 See Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194, 205, 214 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
"7- See Allen v. City of Mobile, 331 F. Supp. 1134, 1150 (S.D. Ala. 1971),
aff'd, 466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972)(per curiam), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973).
176 See Telephone Interview with Kris Banter, Administrator, Seattle School
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Commission enacted a policy under which city officials and
employees could be demoted, suspended, or dismissed for utter-
ing racial slurs while on duty.1 77 And in at least one case a jury
has found government discrimination especially intolerable. In
Haddix v. Port of Seattle,78 a case brought under a state anti-
discrimination statute against a government agency for four years
of abusive treatment at the hands of a white foreman,' 79 the jury
awarded the plaintiff $200,000, rather than the $145,000 the
plaintiff had requested. One juror said, "We set the sum of
$200,000 as a statement that race discrimination is wrong, and
that the port is a public corporation and should be in the
forefront of fighting discrimination."'8
Despite this trend, victims of racial slurs have achieved mix-
ed results when suing persons or entities other than government
officials under various state or federal civil rights laws. Some
plaintiffs have prevailed under state antidiscrimination statutes.
For example, in Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human Rights
Appeal Board,' a restaurant owner had told a waitress that she
thought she was something special, "'Just like all the other f----
Board (May 9, 1982); Memorandum, Seattle School Board, Introduction of a New
Policy: Acts of Hostility or Defamation (June 27, 1979)(copy on file with the
author); Letter from Charles Z. Smith, attorney at law, to Mrs. Patt Sutton, Board
of Directors, Seattle Public Schools (May 10, 1978) (on file with the Harvard Civil
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review).
'" L.A. Times, Aug. 20, 1980, § I, at 1, col. 1. The guideline has been
adopted by at least three dozen San Francisco agencies and school districts. In-
terview with Al Walker, Secretary, San Francisco Civil Service Commission, in
San Francisco, Calif., Oct. 9, 1980. See also Thompson v. City of Minneapolis,
300 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. S. Ct. 1980)(upholding dismissal of city employee, under
city civil service commission rule prohibiting language "wantonly offensive" to
public, for making subsequently published racist remarks in presence of newspaper
reporter).
"I No. 840149, King Co. (Wash.) Super. Ct. (July 31, 1978). See Seattle
Times, Aug. 1, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 1.
"I' The plaintiff was subjected to "abusive racial language, humiliating treat-
ment and inferior work assignments." The foreman had stated, "As long as I am
the foreman out here, white is right," and called the plaintiff a "nigger." See Seattle
Times, Aug. 1, 1978, § A, at 11, col. 1.
"I Id. at 1, col. 1.
18I 52 N.Y.2d 72, 417 N.E.2d 525, 436 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1980).
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ing Jewish broads around here."'"i 2 The owner repeatedly re-
fused to apologize. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
State Division of Human Rights ruling that the petitioner
discriminated against the waitress by reviling her religion in a
matter related to her working conditions and enforced the Divi-
sion's award of $500 to the waitress for "'shock, humiliation, and
outrage.' "183
Other victims of racial slurs, however, have been less suc-
cessful in their efforts to recover against private persons and en-
tities under state and federal laws. An attempt to invoke section
1981184 nd the Civil Rights Act of 1964185 to obtain relief failed
in Howard v. National Cash Register Co.' 86 In that case fellow
employees had used the word "nigger" and other race-related
language in plaintiffs presence.1 7 Although Title VII of the Act
forbids an employer "to limit ... his employees ... in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as em-
ployee, because of such individual's race,"'8 the court found that
the racial abuse did not constitute employment discrimination.189
182 Id. at 76, 417 N.E.2d at 527, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
183 Id. at 76-77, 417 N.E.2d at 528, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 233. See also Brown-
ing v. Slenderella Sys., 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959)(en banc)(reducing
salon's refusal to serve a black woman constitutes discrimination); Anderson v.
Pantages Theatre Co., 114 Wash. 24, 194 P. 813 (1921)(theater's refusal to ad-
mit black attorney to show for which he held tickets constitutes discrimination).
,s4 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
115 Id. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
116 388 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
l Id. at 605.
188 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976).
189 388 F. Supp. at 606. The Howard court apparently felt that it was
powerless to redress the alleged injury:
The language of the factory and the language of the street have long
included words such as "Greaser", "Dago", and "Spick", and "Kike" and
"Chink" as well as "Nigger". In the past three years we have even adopted
as a part of our folk lore a character who is prejudiced and biased aganst
all persons other than of his own neighborhood, religion and nationali-
ty. We refer to such people now as "Archie Bunkers." The Archie
Bunkers of this world, within limitations, still may assert their biased
19821
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And in Irving,'90 the court held that the plaintiff could not re-
cover under an Illinois constitutional provision prohibiting "com-
munications that portray criminality, depravity or lack of virtue
in, or that incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward, a
person or group of persons by reason of or by reference to religious,
racial, ethnic, national or regional affiliation,' 19' because that
provision does not grant a private right of action.' 92
Although it is correct to say, as did the Minnesota Supreme
Court, 93 that the use of a racial insult against a member of a
minority group is race discrimination, apparently no court has
found discrimination solely on the basis of a single racial insult.
Courts appear unwilling to impose the vast liability and oppro-
brium that follow a finding of violation of federal and state
antidiscrimination laws on the makers of racial insults. Recovery
often is stymied further by the requirement, incorporated in
many of these statutes, that there be some relationship between
the parties, such as a contractual 94  or employment
relationship.'9 5 And, of course, it is reasonable to assume that
view. We have not yet reached the point where we have taken from in-
dividuals the right to be prejudiced, so long as such prejudice did not
evidence itself in discrimination. This Court will secure plaintiff against
discrimination; no court can secure him against prejudice.
Id. The court also noted "without comment the following observation": "Against
a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident
to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is
a better protection than the law ever could be." Id. (quoting Magruder, supra note
39, at 1053).
"I See supra text accompanying notes 139-41 & 149-52.
19, I1l. Const. art. I, § 20. The provision was derived from the criminal libel
statute held constitutional in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 250 (1952).
19 46 I11. App. 3d at 165, 360 N.E.2d at 984. See also State Div. of Human
Rights v. McHarris Gift Center, 71 A.D.2d 813, 419 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1979), affd,
52 N.Y.2d 813, 418 N.E.2d 393, 436 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1980)(mem.)(store's sale of
novelties which demean persons of Polish extraction held not violative of New
York antidiscrimination law).
'" See supra text accompanying note 173.
'94 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
E.g., id. § 2000e to 2000e-14 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
As this Article was going to press, a private individual was convicted under
a recently enacted New York statute prohibiting harassment by reference to race
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there is a substantial amount of variation in the protection af-
forded by state antidiscrimination laws. Such problems would be
eliminated by an independent tort for racial insults because it
would protect all victims from racial insults regardless of the
jurisdiction or the relationship between the parties.
B. Objections to a Tort for Racial Insults
Recognition of a tort for racial insults undoubtedly will face
all the objections voiced whenever courts choose to protect a
previously unrecognized interest -the difficulty of measuring and
apportioning damages, the potential for fraudulent claims, and
the prospect of a flood of litigation. 96 Such objections,
however, need not impede the recognition of a new tort. The
now-recognized torts of invasion of privacy, 197 intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, 19 and compensation for prenatal
injuries 99 are illustrations of new causes of action that were
fashioned to cope with substantial injuries that did not fit into an
existing category. As Dean Prosser has observed, "IT]he mere
fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar to the
remedy."2°°
or ethnicity. The harassment in that case was as anti-Semitic slur made in an argu-
ment between neighbors. See N.Y. Times, May 14, 1982, at B2, col. 1. The statute
is Act of July 31, 1981, 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 870, § 1 (codified at N.Y. Civ. Rights
Law § 40-c(3) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
' See W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 1, at 3; Smith, Torts Without Particular
Names, 69 U. Pa. L. Rev. 91 (1921). See generally Ruiz v. Bertolotti, 37 Misc.
2d 1067, 236 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1962)(upholding complaint in prima facie tort which
alleged that defendants threatened physical harm to plaintiffs' family if plaintiffs,
a Mexican American couple, purchased a home in defendants' neighborhood);
Forkosch, An Analysis of the Prima Facie Tort Cause of Action, 42 Cornell L.
Rev. 465 (1957); Comment, Prima Facie Tort, 11 Cumberland L. Rev. 113 (1980).
11 E.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68
(1905). See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
,98 E.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240
P.2d 282 (1952)(en banc). See Magruder, supra note 39.
'1 E.g., Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951). See Note,
Prenatal Injury, 38 Wash. L. Rev. 390 (1963)(citing cases). See also Bernier,
Mothers as Plaintiffs in Prenatal Tort Liability Cases: Recovery for Physical and
Emotional Damages, 4 Harv. Women's L.J. 143 (1981).
2 W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 1, at 3-4. See Kujok v. Goldman, 150 N.Y.
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1. The difficulty of measuring damages
One objection usually raised to torts that protect emotional
well-being is that the intangible and highly subjective interests in-
vaded are difficult to measure and prove.201 This objection has
been rejected as applied to the tort of invasion of privacy,
202
however, and is rapidly being surmounted in the case of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 2°3 Behavior that injures a
person's interest in repose and psychological well-being 2 4 is now
generally actionable despite the difficulties of measuring
damages.
Moreover, a tort for racial insults contains an indisputable
element of harm, the affront to dignity.205 Professor Michelman
and others have argued that the intangible quality of novel in-
terests should not, by itself, preclude valuing them for purposes
of compensation.2 Juries always can assign a value to such in-
terests and their infringement. 27 Alternatively, legislatures can
176, 178, 44 N.E. 773, 775 (1896); C. Fifoot, History and Sources of the Com-
mon Law ch. 4 (1949); Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law
of Torts, 10 Calif. L. Rev. 461 (1922). But see Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41111. App.
2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1963)(drastic change should
originate with legislature).
20, E.g., Western Union v. Wood, 57 F. 471 (5th Cir. 1893); Morgan v.
Hightower, 291 Ky. 58, 163 S.W.2d 21 (1942). See Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 326, 334 (1966).
101 See W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 117, at 815 & nn.44-46 (citing cases).
2"I See generally id. § 12, at 52-60 (tracing development of law of intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
04 See generally Amdursky, The Interest in Mental Tranquillity, 13 Buffalo
L. Rev. 339 (1964).
101 See supra text accompanying notes 57-63. Cf. W. Prosser, supra note 69,
§ 10, at 36 ("The element of personal indignity involved [in battery] always has
been given considerable weight.").
206 See Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundation of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1192 (1967);
Yudof, Liability for Constitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School Of-
ficial, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1322, 1380-81 (1976).
10 See, e.g., Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330, 336 (7th Cir. 1979)aury award-
ed $60,000 compensatory damages); Wiggs v. Courshon, 355 F. Supp. 206, 210
(S.D. Fla. 1973)jury awarded $6000 compensatory damages); Agarwal v. Johnson,
25 Cal. 3d 932, 944, 603 P.2d 58, 65, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 148 (1978)oury award-
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set nominal damages to be recovered for the affront to
dignity.28
Of course, the law does not compensate for every inconve-
nience, bumped elbow, jostled shoulder, or offended ear; against
many of life's minor misfortunes a "toughening of the mental
hide" is the best remedy.201 Not every reference to a person's
race or color is insulting, nor is every insult addressed to a
minority person a racial insult. The cause of action suggested here
is limited to language intended to demean by reference to race,
which is understood as demeaning by reference to race, and
which a reasonable person would recognize as a racial insult. 21 0
The psychological or emotional harm alleged in such cases can be
proved in the same manner as in other torts that protect psycho-
logical well-being.21' Expert testimony can be presented to sub-
stantiate the claim. Although such harms are to the mind and
emotions, the harmful effects of racial speech have been amply
studied and documented.
212
2. The difficulty of apportioning damages
A second potential objection to a tort for racial insults is the
difficulty of apportioning damages. Of course, if proof of direct-
ly related emotional or psychological distress is produced, a
defendant should be liable for this and any other reasonably
foreseeable damages, such as medical expenses or loss of income.
ed $16,400 general damages); Haddix v. Port of Seattle, No. 840149, King. Co.
(Wash.) Super. Ct. (July 31, 1978)(reported in Seattle Times, Aug. 1, 1978, § A,
at 1, col. 1)(jury awarded $200,000 when plaintiff requested $145,000).
208 Cf. Browning v. Slenderella Systems, 54 Wash. 2d 440, 451, 341 P.2d
859, 866 (1959)(en banc)(awarding nominal damages in race discrimination case
because compensatory damages not proven).
Magruder, supra note 39, at 1035.
210 See infra text accompanying notes 274-75.
211 See Battalla v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, Z42 & n.5, 176 N.E.2d 729,
731-32 & n.5, 119 N.Y.S.2d 34, 38 & n.5 (1961)(must look to quality and ge-
nuineness of proof, and rely on expert testimony and ability of court and jury
to weed out fraudulent claims). See also W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 54, at 328
(very clear tendency of recent cases is to refuse to admit inability to value mental
injuries).
212 See supra Part I.
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Absent these more tangible harms, juries should be free to set
damages, within reasonable limits, in order to deter other
wrongdoers. And because racial insults are almost always inten-
tional and malicious, punitive damages may often be
appropriate.
21 3
Even if the victim proves that the defendant's conduct caused
the injury, the defendant may be able to show that the wrongful
act, if committed in isolation, would have produced no harm. In
other words, the defendant may assert that his or her conduct was
only harmful because prior acts of racism rendered the plaintiff
vulnerable to racial slurs. Such an assertion need not preclude
liability, however, because tort law is reluctant to permit defend-
ants to escape liability simply because other factors played a part
in producing the plaintiff's injury.
214
Of the variety of approaches to apportioning damages, two
would be relevant to a tort for racial insults. The first approach
is to discount the harm to the victim attributable to the earlier ac-
tors and to require the present defendant to pay only for any ad-
ditional harm.2S Dean Prosser gives the example of a physician
who negligently inflicts further injury on a patient injured by the
defendant; although the defendant "may be" liable for the subse-
quent injury, the physician would never be liable for the acts of
the defendant. 216 In the case of a racial insult, if the plaintiff's
23 See, e.g., Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330, 336 (7th Cir. 1979)Gury award-
ed $200,000 punitive damages); Wiggs v. Courshon, 355 F. Supp. 206, 210 (S.D.
Fla. 1973)jury awarded $19,000 punitive damages); Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal.
3d 932, 944, 603 P.2d 58, 65, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 148 (1978)(ury awarded $46,000
general damages); Haddix v. Port of Seattle, No. 840149, King. Co. (Wash.)
Super. Ct. (July 31, 1978)(reported in Seattle Times, Aug. 1, 1978, § A, at 1, col.
l)(jury awarded $200,000 when plaintiff requested $145,000).
The goal of deterrence plays an important role in tort law. See, e.g., W. Pro-
sser, supra note 69, § 2, at 9-11 (punitive damages). Recently commentators have
extolled the virtues of deterrence as a means of achieving desirable social results.
See, e.g., G. Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (1970); Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. Leg.
Studies 29 (1972); Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1218-19 (1977).
24 See generally W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 52 (methods of apportioning
damages between defendant and other causes and among defendants).
2,3 See id. § 52, at 320-21.
21 Id. (citing cases).
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psychological and financial well-being has been damaged by
earlier acts of racism, the present defendant would be required to
account only for the incremental harm.
The second approach may be applied when the defendant
has acted in concert with others to injure the victim. 2 7 The
theory of this approach is that the actors, "joint tortfeasors"
under the common law, are each a part of a single enterprise, and
thus the resulting harm is indivisible. This approach is relevant to
a tort for racial insults because the maker of a racial slur
necessarily calls upon the entire history of slavery and racial
discrimination in this country in order to injure the victim. Thus
the defendant is, in effect, a joint tortfeasor along with all others,
past and present, who have perpetuated racism. Accordingly, the
defendant should be liable for the full extent of the injury caused
by the racial insult.
The real problem lurking within the issue of apportioning
damages is the question of the plaintiffs susceptibility to racial
insults. A defendant could argue that his or her own contribution
to the injury was small compared to the overall effect of racism
on the plaintiff or that the racial insult could have caused no
damage because minority group members are or should be inured
to such treatment. Further, the defendant could point to the cir-
cumstance that the "eggshell skull" rule,218 which states that a
wrongdoer is liable for damages attributable to the plaintiffs
peculiar susceptibility even if this susceptibility was not apparent
to the wrongdoer, is not followed in intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress cases. 219
The counterarguments, however, are more persuasive. That
a defendant takes advantage of a plaintiff already harmed by
217 See id. § 52, at 296, 314-15.
218 E.g., Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891).
219 See Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla.
1958)(in answer to customer's query, supermarket clerk replied, "[Y]ou stink to
me"; customer sued, alleging "ensuing heart attack and aggravation of pre-existing
heart disease"; held, complaint does not state cause of action); Restatement (Se-
cond) of Torts § 46 comment j (1965)("The law intervenes only where the distress
is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.'); W. Pro-
sser, supra note 69, § 12, at 59 & n. 17 ('ITihe distress [in general] must be such
as a reasonable man 'of ordinary sensibilities' would undergo under the cir-
cumstances."); supra text accompanying notes 129-33.
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earlier victimization makes the act more, not less, reprehensible;
a contrary rule would imply that racial minorities are "fair game"
for further abuse merely because previously they have been the
object of similar abuse. Further, because a person's race is usually
obvious, the maker of a racial insult is exploiting an apparent
susceptibility rather than causing an unforeseeable injury, as in
the eggshell skull cases. Such an exploitation creates liability even
under the doctrine of intentional infliction of emotional distress
which recognizes that the "extreme and outrageous" character of
the defendant's conduct may be supplied by the defendant's
knowledge that the plaintiff is peculiarly susceptible to emotional
distress.220
Surprisingly, only two courts have addressed the problem of
apportioning damages in racial insult cases. In Alcorn, 2' the
court stated in a footnote, "[We cannot accept defendants' con-
tention that plaintiff, as a truck driver must have become ac-
customed to such abusive language. Plaintiffs own susceptibility
to racial slurs and other discriminatory conduct is a question for
the trier of fact, and cannot be determined on demurrer."2m In
Contreras,223 the court quoted this language with approval,
adding, "It is for the trier of fact to determine, taking into ac-
count changing social conditions and plaintiffs own susceptibili-
ty, whether the particular conduct was sufficient to constitute ex-
treme outrage.""24 That this issue has arisen in so few cases may
suggest that once the liability of the defendants in racial insult
cases is proved, the courts will not intervene to deny or reduce
recovery because of the problem of apportioning damages.
220 See Note, Torts: An Analysis of Mental Distress as an Element of
Damages and as a Basis of an Independent Cause of Action When Intentionally
Caused, 20 Washburn L.J. 106, 116-17 & n.105 (1980)(citing cases involving preg-
nant women, children, and sick people); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, com-
ment f (1965)("The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise
from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional
distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity.").
"I See supra text accompanying notes 113-18.
22 Cal. 3d at 498 n.4, 468 P.2d at 219 n.4, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 91 n.4.
223 See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
24 88 Wash. 2d at 742, 565 P.2d at 1177.
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3. Fraudulent claims and a flood of litigation
Because a tort for racial insults, like the other torts that pro-
tect psychological well-being, would present complex problems of
proof of causation and of damages, it will face the objection that
it would encourage fraudulent claims and generate a flood of
litigation.22 In some jurisdictions, the fear of fraudulent claims
is reflected in a rule that denies relief to plaintiffs who suffer no
physical harm. 6 Apparently, these jurisdictions believe that
physical injuries are more easily proved and less easily
feigned.227 Whatever its value in other contexts, this limitation is
unnecessary in actions for racial insults. If racial invective is
aimed at a victim, an infringement of the plaintiffs dignity, at the
least, has occurred. Moreover, even if occasional plaintiffs win
recoveries based on nonexistent damages, there is no reason to
assume that these results would be erroneous more often than is
the case in other types of civil litigation. At any rate, both correct
and erroneous results would deter future offenses and thus pro-
tect the rights of others who cannot or will not seek redress.228
The specter of a "flood of litigation" was also raised, and
ultimately rejected, 229 in connection with the torts of invasion of
privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Empirical
studies show that the volume of litigation in response to the
judicial recognition of new torts has not been overwhelming. 30
22See Western Union v. Wood, 57 F. 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1893); C. McCor-
mick, Damages § 86 (1935); W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 54, at 328; Kalven, supra
note 201, at 338.
226 See W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 12, at 59-60.
227 See generally id. § 12, at 50-51 (discussing objections to recovery for
mental injuries); id. § 54, at 328 (same).
2' See Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the-Constitution: Is Warren and
Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 Tex. L. Rev. 611, 620
(1968).
229 See, e.g., Chiucholo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329,
334-35, 150 A. 540, 543 (1930); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d
344, 347 (Utah 1961); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: A New
Tort, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 874, 877 (1939).
2 See W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 54, at 327-28; McNiece, Psychic Injury
and Tort Liability in New York, 24 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 31 (1949); Wade, Tort
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Moreover, the inconvenience and expense of a lawsuit will ade-
quately deter frivolous or fraudulent claims. It is the role of
courts to redress wrongs even at the risk of an increase in judicial
business. A "flood of litigation," therefore, would suggest that
the courts were performing their function of placing the cost of
the harm on the perpetrator. In addition, arguments based on a
flood of litigation are most persuasive when adequate nonjudicial
remedies are available. But because a tort for racial slurs im-
plicates speech, and thus requires interest-balancing under the
first amendment, it may not be possible to rely on nonjudicial
forums.
231
C. Objections Based on the First Amendment
It is surprising, especially after Collin, 32 that the question
whether racial insults are protected by the first amendment has
not arisen in any case involving a racial insult. Until it does, the
extent to which free speech considerations would shape the cause
of action must remain an open question. No reported decision is
on point; analysis can proceed only by examination of the nature
of racial insults and the policies that underlie the first amend-
ment.
Under first amendment doctrine, regulation of expressive ac-
tivities is scrutinized more closely when directed at content of the
speech rather than merely at the time, place, or manner of the
speech in question. 233 Because racial insults differ from or-
dinary, non-actionable insults234 precisely because they use racial
Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 63, 77 (1950).
21 See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Minneapolis, 300 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. S.
Ct. 1980)(newspaper reporter who accompanied city building inspector for one
day published inspector's racist remark; inspector discharged under city civil ser-
vice commission rule prohibiting language "wantonly offensive" to public; held,
rule does not violate first amendment either on face or as applied to inspector).
2 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). See supra text
accompanying notes 5-9.
23 See L. Tribe, supra note 58, § 12-2; Redish, The Content Distinction in
First Amendment Analysis, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 113, 113 & n.3 (1981)(citing cases).
But see Redish, supra (criticizing this distinction).
131 See W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 12, at 54-55.
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terms for the purpose of demeaning the victim, a tort for racial
insults will almost surely be seen as a regulation of content and
thus be subject to the more exacting scrutiny afforded in such
cases. But regardless of the standard applied, courts ultimately
must balance the government's interest against that of the utterer
of the infringed speech.2
5
1. The Government Interests
The primary government interest served by a tort action for
racial insults is the elimination of the harms of racism and racial
insults discussed earlierY 6 Not only the victim of a racial insult
but also his or her children,2 7 future generations,238 and our en-
tire society239 are harmed by racial invective and the tradition of
racism which it furthers.
The government also has an interest in regulating the use of
words harmful in themselves. In Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire,240 the United States Supreme Court stated that words
which "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace" are not protected by the first
amendment.241 Racial insults, and even some of the words which
2' See L. Tribe, supra note 58, § 12-2, at 583 (impossible to escape task of
weighing the competing interests); Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and
First Amendment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 915, 962 (1978)(arguing
that Supreme Court follows a "general balancing approach" in first amendment
cases, in some cases applying general rules while in others engaging in ad hoc deci-
sion making).
236 See supra Part I.
21 See supra text accompanying note 29.
238 See supra text accompanying notes 44-53.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
4 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
241 Id. at 572. Although Chaplinsky was a "fighting words" case, and thus
its statement about words which inflict injury "by their very utterance" arguably
should not be read as a constitutional mandate, this clause has been quoted with
approval by the Court as recently as 1974. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans (Lewis
II), 415 U.S. 130, 133 (1974)(quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525
(1972)).
Apparently, the Court never has overturned a conviction for "fighting words"
except on an overbreadth analysis. For convictions overturned on an overbreadth
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might be used in a racial insult, inflict injury by their very
utterance. 2 Words such as "nigger" and "spick" are badges of
degradation even when used between friends; these words have
no other connotation.
The Supreme Court also has recognized that in some con-
texts the government may restrict speech directed at a captive or
unwilling audience. These cases have concerned speech both
inside 3 and outside2" the home. However, in Cohen v. Califor-
nia24 5 the Court overturned a conviction for wearing a jacket
with the words "Fuck the Draft" written on it. In meeting the
state's argument that the message was thrust upon unwilling
listeners, the Court pointed out that viewers could simply avert
their eyes.246
analysis, see Lewis v. City of New Orleans (Lewis II), 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Plum-
mer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973)(per curiam); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey,
408 U.S. 901 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 211, 215 n.13 (1975)(striking down, as content-based discrimination, or-
dinance prohibiting drive-in motion picture theaters from exhibiting films con-
taining nudity where screen visible from street, but implying that a "narrowly
drawn nondiscriminatory traffic regulation requiring screening of drive-in theatres
from public view" would be constitutional).
14 See generally L. Tribe, supra note 58, § 12-8, at 606 (what separates ut-
terances which falsely damage reputation or reveal intimate secrets from other
speech is that "'more talk' is exceedingly unlikely to cure the injury").
243 Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Breard
v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). But
see Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943)(striking down ordinance pro-
hibiting summoning resident to door in order to distribute handbills; Breard Court
claimed Martin held ordinance invalid "as applied to the free distribution of
dodgers 'advertising a religious meeting,"' 341 U.S. at 642).
244 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)(plurality opinion); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). But see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 211, 215 n.13 (1975)(striking down, as content-based discrimination, or-
dinance prohibiting drive-in motion picture theaters from exhibiting films con-
taining nudity where screen visible from street, but implying that a "narrowly
drawn nondiscriminatory traffic regulation requiring screening of drive-in theatres
from public view" would be constitutional).
245 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
246 Id. at 20.
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Racial insults are easily distinguishable from the inscription in
Cohen. One cannot avert one's ears from an insult. More impor-
tantly, a racial insult is directed at a particular victim; it is analo-
gous to the statement "Fuck you," not the statement "Fuck the
Draft."47 Finally, a racial insult, unlike the slogan in Cohen,248
is not political speech;249 its perpetrator intends not to discover
truth or advocate social action but to injure the victim. 250
2. The Free Speech Interests
Examination of the free speech values served by a racial in-
sult is best undertaken within the framework of the categories
outlined by Professor Emerson in his seminal article, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment. 25' Four categories of
values are suggested by Professor Emerson: individual self-
fulfillment; ascertainment of the truth; securing participation by
the members of society in social and political decision making;
and maintaining of the balance between stability and change.
a. Individual Self-Fulfillment
The values of individual self-fulfillment to be furthered
through free expression are based on the rights of individuals to
247 Professor Tribe has found in Cohen acknowledgment, at least, of a
privacy interest in not being put "on the spot," that is, a right to "resist public
scrutiny of [one's] response" to powerful stimuli. See L. Tribe, supra note 58,
§ 12-19, at 681.
24 See 403 U.S. at 18 (recognizing the political content of the slogan in
Cohen).
249 See infra text accompanying notes 258-6Q.
250 In Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), the Supreme Court
upheld a criminal statute prohibiting the defamation of racial groups. Although
the continuing validity of Beauharnais is in doubt, see Collin, 578 F.2d at 1205;
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); Schauer, Categories and the First Amend-
ment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 265, 268 n.17 (1981), it has never
been overruled. See Schauer, supra, at 268 n. 17. See generally Arkes, Civility and
the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups, 1974 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 281, 331 (arguing that the "most odious cases" of group defamation
should be subject to criminal liability).
251 72 Yale L.J. 877, 878-86 (1963).
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develop their full potentials as members of the human
community.252 But bigotry, and thus the attendant expression of
racism, stifles, rather than furthers, the moral and social growth
of the individual who harbors it.25 In addition, a racial insult is
only in small part an expression of self: it is primarily an attempt
to injure through the use of words. 4 No one would argue that
the value of self-fulfillment is not limited by consideration of the
effects of one's means of expression on other members of society.
Although one may dress in Nazi uniforms and demonstrate
before the city hall in Skokie, Illinois, one may not paint
swastikas on one's neighbors' doors.25
b. Ascertainment of the Truth
Professor Emerson argued that "[t]hrough the acquisition of
new knowledge, the toleration of new ideas, the testing of opin-
ion in open competition, the discipline of rethinking its assump-
tions, a society will be better able to reach common decisions that
will meet the needs and aspirations of its members." 6 This
function of free speech, to achieve the best decisions on matters
of interest to all, has been extremely influential in first amend-
ment literature. Indeed, one theory of the first amendment is that
the amendment's protections extend only to speech that can be
characterized as "political." 7 In this respect most racial insults
are distinguishable from the expressions found protected in
Collin.2,8 The plaintiff in Collin, the National Socialist Party of
252 See id. at 879-80.
2J See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
24 It is in this sense that racial insults are words that inflict injury by their
very utterance and thus are not protected speech. In fact, a racial insult might
be seen as not "speech" at all. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the
Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv.
L. Rev. 1482, 1501 (1975)(yelling "boo" at cardiac patient); supra text accompa-
nying notes 16-22-
25 See infra text accompanying note 262.
Emerson, supra note 251, at 882.
' See A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech And Its Relation to Self-Government
(1948); A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom (1960).
21 See supra text accompanying notes 5-9.
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America, was a political party whose race-related beliefs were
only a part of a set of ideals.25 9 But the characteristic most
significant in determining the value of racial insults is that they
are not intended to inform or convince the listener. Racial insults
invite no discourse, and no speech in response can cure the in-
flicted harm.
26°
Racial insults may usefully be analogized to obscenity.
Although the government may regulate obscenity, it may not pro-
hibit expression of the view that obscenity should be protected or
that, for example, adultery may be proper behavior. 26' Similarly,
protecting members of racial minorities from injury through
racial insults, and society itself from the accumulated harms of
racism, is very different from prohibiting espousal of the view
that race discrimination is proper.
262
The reasons the Supreme Court articulated in explaining why
obscenity may be regulated are also instructive in analyzing
219 The opinion states, "Among NSPA's more controversial and generally
unacceptable beliefs are that black persons are biologically inferior to white per-
sons, and should be expatriated to Africa as soon as possible; that American Jews
have "inordinate... political and financial power" in the world and are "in the
forefront of the international Communist revolution." 578 F.2d at 1199 (emphasis
added).
I See F. Haiman, Speech and Law in a Free Society 425 (1981). Cf. Lin-
mark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977)(" 'If there
be time to expose through discourse the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil
by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence.' ")(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)(Brandeis, J.,
concurring)); L. Tribe, supra note 58, § 12-8, at 606 (what separates utterances
which falsely damage reputation or reveal intimate secrets from other speech is
that "'more talk' is exceedingly unlikely to cure the injury").
26' Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 360
U.S. 684 (1959). See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67
(1973)(regulation of obscentity is "distinct from a control of reason and the in-
tellect....The fantasies of a drug addict are his own and beyond the reach of
government, but government regulation of drug sales is not prohibited by the
Constitution.").
2 See generally Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70
(1976)(plurality opinion)(upholding regulation of location of new adult motion
picture theaters in part because such a regulation does not discriminate based upon
"message" or "point of view'). But see id. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting)(Young
an "aberration").
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racism and racial insults. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,263
the Court pointed to the "at least ... arguable correlation be-
tween obscene material and crime'"2" and the "'right of the Na-
tion and of the States to maintain a decent society."'265 Racial
insults, through the racism and race discrimination they further,
are severely at odds with the goals of antidiscrimination laws and
the commands of the thirteenth amendment. A prohibition of
such insults would surely further the government's interest in
maintaining a "decent society."
c. Participation in Decision Making
In a democracy, as Professor Emerson argued, all members
of society must be permitted to voice their opinions so that the
government's authority is derived in fact "from the consent of the
governed." '266 Racial insults do not further this goal. On the con-
trary, they constitute "badges and incidents of slavery"267 and
contribute to a stratified society268 in which political power is
possessed by some and denied to others.
d. The Balance between Stability and Change
Some of the many evils of the suppression of expression also
are effects of racism and racial insults. Professor Emerson men-
tioned the following arguments, among others, under the rubric
of maintaining the balance between stability and change: suppres-
sion of discussion substitutes force for logic; suppression of
speech promotes institutional rigidity and inability to respond to
changing circumstances; free expression leads those who lose
-3 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
26 Id. at 58 (footnote omitted).
26s Id. at 59-60 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199
(1964)(Warren, C.J., dissenting)). Professor Tribe finds three reasons articulated
in Paris, although his third reason appears substantially the same as the second
reason given in the text. See L. Tribe, supra note 58, § 12-16, at 666-67.
m Emerson, supra note 251, at 883 (quoting The Declaration of In-
dependence para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
167 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
263 See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
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public controversies to accept the result because they have had an
opportunity to convert others to their opinion; and freedom of
expression prevents violent upheavals by alerting the government
to valid grievances.269 But racism, in part through racial slurs,
furthers all the evils caused by the suppression of speech. Racism
dulls the moral and social senses of its perpetrators, 270 while
disabling its victims from fully participating in society27l and
leaving unprejudiced members of society demoralized. 272 Bigotry
and systems of discrimination continue to exist for no reason
other than that the prejudiced are in positions of power or
authority. Institutions infected by these ills will be peopled by
like-minded individuals and thus will be slow to respond to
changing circumstances. Furthermore, racism excludes minorities
from participating in the contemplation of public issues because
their concerns are discounted by the majority and because they
have been demoralized by repeated victimization. And it is pain-
fully clear that this exclusion, not only from political discussion
but also from the abundance of our country's wealth, is capable
of leading to violent outbreaks. 273
III. Elements of the Cause of Action
In order to prevail in an action for a racial insult, the plain-
tiff should be required to prove that
Language was addressed to him or her by the defendant
that was intended to demean through reference to race;
that the plaintiff understood as intended to demean
through reference to race; and that a reasonable person
would recognize as a racial insult.
Thus, it would be expected that an epithet such as "You damn
nigger" would almost always be found actionable, as it is highly
269 Emerson, supra note 251, at 884-85.
270 See supra text accompanying notes 37 & 38.
271 See supra text accompanying notes 42 & 43.
272 See supra text accompanying note 41.
273 See, e.g., Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, supra note 11.
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insulting and highly racial. However, an insult such as "You in-
competent fool," directed at a black person by a white, even in a
context which made it highly insulting, would not be actionable
because it lacks a racial component. "Boy," directed at a young
black male, might be actionable, depending on the speaker's in-
tent, the hearer's understanding, and whether a reasonable person
would consider it a racial insult in the particular context. "Hey,
nigger," spoken affectionately between black persons and used as
a greeting, would not be actionable. 274 An insult such as "You
dumb honkey," directed at a white person, could be actionable
under this formulation of the cause of action, but only in the
unusual situations where the plaintiff would suffer harm from
such an insult.275
The plaintiff may be able to show aggravating cir-
cumstances, such as abuse of a position of power or authority
276
or knowledge of the victim's susceptibility to racial insults, which
may render punitive damages appropriate. 277 The common law
defenses of privilege278 and mistake2 79 may be applicable, and
274 However, if the language was intended and understood as demeaning,
minority plaintiffs could sue other members of the same or another minority
group. See generally Mebane, In Carolina: Growing Up Black in the '40s, Time,
March 2, 1981, at 6, 7 (excerpt from M. Mebane, Mary (1981)) (maltreatment of
"black Black" by lighter-skinned blacks).
275 The cause of action outlined is intended primarily to protect members of
racial minority groups traditionally victimized. However, in some situations racial
insults may cause harm when directed at members of the majority. The best ex-
ample of such a situation would be the insult "You dumb honkey" directed at a
white child by a black teacher in a predominantely black school. The potential
for psychological harm in such a situation is obvious. And although the basis for
the tort, the legacy of slavery and race discrimination, might seem to limit the
class of those who can bring such actions to members of traditionally victimized
minorities, it is the use of race to make invidious distinctions that is the ultimate
evil the tort is designed to combat.
276 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 1-4 & 113-21.
2" See supra note 214 & accompanying text.
278 Cf. W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 114, at 776-85 (absolute privileges to
action for defamation, including judicial and legislative immunities).
2 7 See W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 17 (mistake as defense to intentional
tort). The defense of mistake might lie if, for example, a defendant used a racially
offensive word or phrase unaware of its harmful connotation; unaware that the
individual to whom it was uttered is a member of a minority group who would
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retraction of the insult may mitigate damages.20
Conclusion
This Article began by considering the serious harms inflicted
by racism and racial insults. It found that not only those to whom
racial insults are addressed but also the perpetrators and society
as a whole are victimized. Perhaps most disturbingly, this review
of the social science literature revealed that racism and racial in-
sults influence the parenting practices of minority individuals and
have a very great effect on children, thus perpetuating the harms
of racism.
Next, the Article considered current legal protection from
racial insults. It revealed that although plaintiffs have prevailed
in actions based substantially on racial insults, the doctrines
under which these plaintiffs sued have inherent limitations which
ensure that many victims of racial insults will be unable to
recover. Finally, objections to an independent tort for racial in-
sults were considered, and it was concluded that these objections
would not preclude the tort. The Article noted that the objections
have not been squarely addressed in any case, which may indicate
that they have not been considered substantial by courts and
practicing lawyers.
An independent tort for racial slurs would protect the in-
terests of personality and equal citizenship that are part of our
highest political traditions and moral values, thereby affirming
the right of all citizens to lead their lives free from attacks on
their dignity and psychological integrity. It is an avenue of redress
that deserves explicit judicial recognition.
find it painful and insulting; or unaware that the person toward whom the insult
was addressed was within earshot. See generally N.Y. Times, May 12, 1974, at
1, col. 5 (according to sources, then-President Richard Nixon used words "wop"
(referring to Judge Sirica), "Jew boys" (officials at SEC), and "thick-necked Micek"
(Patrick Gray) in private conversations in White House).
I Cf. W. Prosser, supra note 69, § 116, at 799 (in defamation actions, par-
tial defense of retraction is available if made immediately after the utterance and
"so clearly connected with it that in effect it negatives the utterance itself")(foot-
note omitted).
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